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Legal and political analyses tend to downplay the problem of spatiality evoked in the 
notion of an “Area” of Freedom, Security and Justice, focusing instead on the dis-
tinct policy fields covered by this triad of values. Whatever its merits, this analytic 
strategy neglects the central claim hidden in what seems to be but a flatulent title: 
the closure of space into a legal place, into a bounded region, is ingredient to the 
very possibility and concrete realization of freedom, security and justice. This paper 
explores this claim in four stages. Initially it examines and rejects the preliminary 
objection that globalisation marks the irreversible decline of legal place as a consti-
tutive feature of social life. Then it develops a legal topology of the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, arguing that two different modes of the inside/outside distinc-
tion are at stake in Articles 61 and 63 ECT. Subsequently, drawing on Communica-
tion 459/98 and the Preambles to the Treaties, the paper outlines a topogenesis of 
the Area, describing the representational process by which its boundaries are pos-
ited. The paper concludes by asserting that the primacy of security over freedom and 
justice is related to the paradox governing a fledgling European public order: in the 
process of enforcing the Union’s claim to an own place, the Area of Freedom, Secu-
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and Bert van Roermund. I. An Image of Unity 
The boundary separating land 
from water emerges somewhere 
north of the Kanin Peninsula, me-
anders around Norway, Sweden 
and Finland and briefly ducks into 
St. Petersburg; then it turns west, 
takes the Danish hurdle and dips 
toward France, but not before 
pausing to let the beholder take in 
the British Isles, Ireland and, far 
out at sea, Iceland; after reaching 
Cabo de São Vicente, the western-
most point of the continent, the 
boundary presses eastward, pro-
gressively separating Spain, Italy 
and Greece from the Mediterra-
nean; finally, it heads north, 
threading up the western side of the Bosporus and the Black Sea before plunging into 
darkness somewhere east of the Crimean Peninsula. A circle of twelve yellow stars 
straddles the blue continent, casting its pale light as far as the northern coast of Africa, 
faintly visible at the lower side of the frame. 
  This well-known image, made available to the public on the European Union’s 
Internet site,1 depicts the Union as a spatial unity. Various devices contribute to the de-
piction of unity: the border separating land from water, the contrast between light and 
dark blue, the circle of stars. Paradoxically, the very devices that serve to depict the 
European Union as a spatial unity also undercut this unity. Notice, to begin with, that 
by modulating the shades from dark to light blue, the image ensures that the passage 
from Asia to Europe takes place imperceptibly, intimating in a blurred sort of way the 
Ural mountain range and concealing the geographical continuity that links both conti-
nents. Moreover, the passage from dark to light takes place well to the left of the 
frame’s edge, in such a way that the roving eye, finding no reason to dwell in a zone of 
dark indeterminacy, quickly returns to the determinateness of Europe. And then the 
circle of stars: a circle is the geometric form par excellence of a harmonious closure. It 
would have been wonderful if the circle could have been large enough to embrace Spain 
and Portugal; but increasing its diameter would have had the embarrassing effect of 
gathering in a substantial part of northern Africaand the entire Asian portion of Tur-
key. So, instead, the diameter of the circle is rendered smaller than the continent. But 
this artifice creates a new problem, for in the very process of depicting spatial unity it 
differentiates between a centre and a periphery.2 
                                                   
1 http://europa-eu-un.org/images/home/1img.gif. 
2 The circle of twelve stars on a blue background is, incidentally, a homage to the Virgin Mary by 
the Catholic designer, Arsène Heitz, who sought inspiration in Chapter 12, verse 1 of the Book of Revela-
tions: “And there appeared a great wonder in heaven; a woman clothed with the sun, and the moon under 
her feet, and upon her head a crown of twelve stars”. See Vittorio Messori, “Dall’aureola dell’Immacolata le 
dodici stelle dell’Europa: La bandiera dell’Unione ispirata alla corona della Vergine”, in Corriere della 
Sera, 14 July 2003. I am grateful to Gido Berns for having brought this article to my attention. 
  2  This image reveals, it would seem, the highly problematic status of the spatial 
unity the European Union claims for itself, not least when constituting itself as an “Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice”. In the words of Article 2 of the Treaty on European 
Union (hereinafter cited as TEU), the Union seeks to “maintain and develop the Union 
as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is 
assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border con-
trols, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime”. As critics have 
pointed out, the area in which freedom, security and justice are to reign is a spurious 
geographical unity. Moreover, even if one were to accept that Europe is a geographical 
unity, the fact remains that the European Union also extends its reach to overseas terri-
tories outside Europe, as attested to, amongst others, by Ceuta and Melillathe Span-
ish enclaves in Morocco, and French Polynesia and New Caledonia in the Pacific, not to 
mention the Falklands in the South Atlantic. Once this point has been made, critical 
attention withdraws from the problem of spatiality evoked in referring to the European 
Union as an “area”, and is henceforth redirected to the specific policy fields grouped 
under the general categories “freedom”, “security” and “justice”. In particular, there is 
growing concern about the fact that security has become the overriding imperative of 
the Area, largely crowding out freedom and justice. 
The concern about the primacy of security is more than justified, and I will re-
turn to examine it in greater detail at the end of this paper. Nonetheless, this line of 
critical thinking, despite its merits, tends to take for granted that the spatial unity 
claimed for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice could be reduced to geographi-
cal unity. Although correct as far as it goes, the charge that Europe is a bogus geo-
graphical unity is moot: whether spurious or authentic, geographical unity is, as we 
shall see, irrelevant to an understanding of the unity of a legal space in general, and of 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in particular. Paradoxically, therefore, this 
reductive critical strategy cannot take seriously the fundamental claim hidden in what 
at first blush is no more than a flatulent title: freedom, security and justice are spatially 
determined values. This remains, however, too imprecise a formulation, for it suggests 
that “area” and “space” are interchangeable terms, such that one could just as well 
speak of a “Space of Freedom, Security of Justice”. And such is indeed the case in the 
French and Spanish versions of the Treaties, for example, which refer respectively to an 
“espace” and an “espacio”. Yet a certain linguistic awkwardness that arises when, in 
English, one substitutes “area” for “space”, hints at a conceptual distinction that is ab-
solutely essential to our subject. Whereas “place”, harking back to the Greek notion of 
topos, can be provisionally defined as a bounded region, “space”, especially in its mod-
ern connotations, stands for a boundless extension. On this view, one of the politically 
and philosophically most challenging claims raised by the Amsterdam Treaty, a claim 
reiterated by the draft Constitution for Europe, is that the terms of this triad are topi-
cal: place is ingredient to the very possibility and concrete actualisation of freedom, 
security and justice. 
  Hence, while it is certainly meaningful to argue that one of the main tasks con-
fronting the European Union, both in terms of policy-making and constitutional archi-
tecture, is to achieve a “right balance” between these values, what interests me in this 
paper is to explore what sense can be made of the claim to territorial unity involved in 
the notion of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. This interest is both philoso-
phical and political. Indeed, the neutrality and unobtrusiveness of this notion disappear 
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freedom, no security, no justice without inclusionliterally; by the same token, no 
freedom, no security, no justice without exclusionliterally. Yet, and this is the burn-
ing question underlying the problem of a skewed balance, does not the exclusion giving 
rise to the European Union’s placial unity also promote servitude, insecurity and injus-
tice? Is not a legal place what renders possible all claims to freedom, security and jus-
tice, and yet, at the same time, by excluding those outside that place, undercuts these 
very same claims? Can the terms of this triad ever simply be located within a legal 
place? Where, then, are freedom, security and justice? 
I will argue hereinafter that the key to these issues is the reflexive constitution 
of territoriality. Indeed, legal communities are not simply located somewhere in space, 
like, say, a boulder lying in a field. A community mustliterallyfind place in a con-
tinuous process of relating to space, even in those comparatively recent cases, histori-
cally speaking, when its external borders are cartographically demarcated and stabi-
lized. A relation to an own place, hence a claim to territorial unity, is no less constitu-
tive of “sedentary” communities, such as the nation-state or the European Union, than 
it is of a nomadic community. In other words, the question concerning what it means 
for a community to be a territorial unity is neither given in advance nor fixed once and 
for all; on the contrary, part of what it means to be a community is to have to continu-
ously reinterpret the claim to an own place. Thus, territorial unity involves a reflexive 
form of collective identity: taking up a relation to an own place necessarily engages a 
community in a relation to itselfand vice versa. 
 
 
II. The Decline of Place? 
Before exploring, with respect to the European Union, why and how place and reflexive 
identity might be ingredient to the very possibility and concrete actualisation of free-
dom, security and justice, it is first necessary to pass a preliminary threshold test: is 
place, when defined as a bounded region, at all ingredient to these terms? This pre-
liminary question merits consideration because an influential current of contemporary, 
primarily sociological, research argues that processes of globalisation have profoundly 
transformed social space. Would it not be necessary to examine the kind of spatiality 
involved in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the perspective of such trans-
formations, rather than appeal once again to spatial categories typical of the nation-
state? More pointedly, may we uncritically assume that the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice can be adequately characterized as a place if, as has been asserted, global-
isation marks the irreversible decline of place as a constitutive feature of social life? 
 
1. “Transnational Social Spaces” 
Such, in substance, is the thesis advocated by Ulrich Beck: “The association of place 
with community or society is breaking down. The changing and choosing of place is the 
model for biographical glocalization”.3 The close connection between place and com-
m u n i t y  i s ,  a s  h e  s e e s  i t ,  p a r a d i g m a t i c  f o r  t h e  national community. The primacy of 
communities organized in the form of closed spaces with stable borders corresponds to 
the period of history in which the nation-state has been the dominant form of political 
                                                   
3 Ulrich Beck, What is Globalization?, trans. Patrick Camiller (Cambridge, Mass.: Polity Press, 
2000), p. 74 [hereinafter cited as Globalization]. 
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ising the nation-state; categories such as people, class, citizen, state and culture pre-
suppose and give expression to a “territorial bias”, such that “humanity is divided into 
political unities, defined and organized as closed territorial states”.4 Globalisation chal-
lenges this paradigm in a fundamental way by transforming the structure of social 
space. Negatively defined, globalisation consists in a “deterritorialisation of the social”: 
A key experience of modern society is that the space of society is no longer defined by or 
linked to presence at one place . . . this means that geographical and social proximity do not 
coincide. One need not live in one place to live in community, and to live in the same place in 
no way means to live in community.5 
Positively defined, globalisation gives rise to a novel spatial paradigm, which Beck calls 
transnational social spaces. This new paradigm “cancel[s] the local associations of 
community that are contained in the national concept of society. The figure of thought 
at issue joins together what cannot be combined: to live and act both here and there”.6 
  Importantly, the nascence of transnational social spaces involves a transforma-
tion of the nature and function of spatial boundaries. Borders, in the paradigm of the 
nation-state, are related to “exclusive” distinctions that organize space and identities in 
disjunctive patterns. Inclusive distinctions, on the other hand, are conjunctive. As such, 
“they facilitate a different, more mobile and, if you like, cooperative concept of ‘bor-
ders’. Here borders arise not through exclusion but through particularly solid forms of 
‘double inclusion’”.7 In short, inclusive distinctions make it possible to be on both sides 
of the border, here and there, rather than here or there. These ideas seem to fit well 
with the European Union. For, arguably, one of the central objectives of the European 
Union is to promote “place polygamy”8 and to foster a sense of overlapping loyalties. 
Indeed, the construction of the European Union is premised, amongst others, on the 
idea that the borders between the Member States of the Union forfeit their exclusive 
character, taking on an inclusive status. This transformation suggests that the Euro-
pean Union has become, as Beck explicitly contends, a “transnational structure”,9 irre-
ducible to the closed territoriality of the nation-state. 
  The “either-or” character of national state boundaries is intimately related, on 
Beck’s view, to a no less disjunctive characterization of familiarity and strangeness: 
“The road to the nation state is paved with oppression. Its law reads: Either-or. Exter-
nally, this implies exclusion, construction of strangeness and enemy stereotypes . . .; 
internally it means forced assimilation, expulsion and destroying the culture and life of 
‘deviant’  groups . . .”10 Globalisation, fuelled by factors such as individual mobility, 
tourism and commercial relations, undermines and surpasses the nationally based di-
chotomy between the familiar and the strange, such that the sharp “either-or” disjunc-
tion is increasingly substituted by the blurred conjunction “and”: “Individualization 
                                                   
4 Ulrich Beck, “Wie wird Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung möglich?Eine Einleitung”, 
in Ulrich Beck (ed.) Politik der Globalisierung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998) pp. 13, 15 [hereinafter cited as 
Demokratie]. 
5 Id., at 12. 
6 Beck, Globalization, supra note 3, at 28. 
7 Id., at 51. 
8 Beck, Demokratie, supra note 4, at 73. 
9 Beck, Globalization, supra note 3, at 159. See also Beck, Demokratie, supra note 4, at 31. 
10 Ulrich Beck, The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order, 
trans. Mark Ritter (Cambridge, Mass.: Polity Press 1997), p. 74, translation altered. 
  5processes, considered globally, abolish prerequisites for constructing and renewing na-
tional oppositions between the familiar and the strange”.11 
  The passage from disjunctive to conjunctive boundaries, and from disjunctive to 
conjunctive manifestations of the familiar and the strange, characterizes the European 
project. Beck notes that “[m]any are tortured by the remarkably essentialist question: 
What is Europe? Not uncommonly the answer states what Europe was. ‘There can be 
no return to Europe, for the simple reason that Europe only exists in the museum of 
rhetoric’”.12 Somewhat less rhetorically, Beck makes the point that Europe cannot be 
reduced to any single identity. Not surprisingly, the confusing question whether Europe 
is a political unity misses the point entirely: not only is there no political Europe but, 
for the time being, its non-existence is not experienced as a problem or deficiency. 
Moreover, the European Union marks the demise of exclusive sovereignty, that is, of 
the principle that “control over a determinate territory cannot be exercised at the same 
time by two authorities”.13 The transfer of sovereign rights to the European Community 
shows, in effect, that the legal orders of the Member States and the European Union 
“overlap”: two different legal orders and their attendant authorities exercise legal 
power over the same territory. 
  Returning to our threshold question, is it wise, in the face of this array of em-
pirical materials and sociological arguments, to take for granted that the Area of Free-
dom, Security and Justice is a place? Does not the assumption that place is ingredient 
to freedom, security and justice remain blind to the spatial innovation introduced by 
the European Union? Pointedly, does not this line of inquiry serve an ideological func-
tion by contributing to maintaining the “appearance of self-evidence, ‘naturalness’ and 
‘insuperability’”14 the closed nation-state claims for itself? 
 
2. “One and the Same Territory” 
The shortest and most direct answer is factual, of course, and consists in pointing out 
that the lifting of internal borders and barriers between the Member States coincides 
with the positing of external borders that determine the European Union as a novel ter-
ritorial unity. In the words of Article 14(2) of the Treaty Establishing a European Com-
munity (hereinafter referred to as ECT), “[t]he internal market shall comprise an area 
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty”. And Article 3(2) of 
the draft Constitution for Europe reiterates and summarizes the guiding principle of 
Titles IV ECT and VI TEU, asserting that “the Union shall offer its citizens an area of 
freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers . . .” In both Articles, an “area” 
is a bounded region, a legal place in our provisional definition of this concept. The 
“double inclusiveness” of borders, to which Beck refers, may hold with respect to bor-
ders between the Member States, but certainly not with respect to the external borders 
of the Union. The inclusiveness of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice goes hand 
in hand with exclusion. How must we interpret this state of affairs? Does it suggest that 
although the European Union has in fact not yet succeeded in entirely superseding the 
claim to territorial unity governing the nation-state, moving beyond this claim is in 
principle both conceptually possible and normatively desirable? Or, on the contrary, is 
                                                   
11 Id., at 75, translation altered. 
12 Beck, Globalization, supra note 3, at 156. Beck cites an article by Rolf F. Sieferle. 
13 Beck, Demokratie, supra note 4, at 15. 
14 Id., at 14-15. 
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such? 
Any answer to this problem must begin by reconsidering what Beck calls the 
“association of place with community”. Can it be assumed, as he does, that this associa-
tion is limited to national communities, until the meaning of place as such and the na-
ture of its relation to community have been clarified? Although social geography, cul-
tural studies and philosophy offer a cornucopia of studies on place, we can limit our-
selves to the butt of Beck’s critique, namely, legal place and its relation to legal com-
munity.15 
  His view on legal place boils down to two presuppositions. The first is that, de-
fined as a closed space with fixed boundaries, territoriality is a precondition for the ex-
ercise of state power. “States have fixed boundaries that both stake out and ground 
their space of authority (Herrschaftsraum). Within these boundaries, they can issue 
laws and administer justice”.16 By defining territoriality in this way, Beck draws on the 
doctrinal framework of Western public law in general, and German public law in par-
ticular, which defines territory as one of the essential “elements” of a nation-state. To 
cite Paul Laband, one of the best-known German public lawyers of the XIXth century, 
“the territory of the state constitutes the spatial sphere of power in which the state un-
folds the rights of dominion (Herrschaftsrechte) to which it is entitled”.17 And Georg 
Jellinek formulates it as follows: “The land on which a state community is established 
characterizes from a legal perspective the space with respect to which the state author-
ity can unfold its specific activity, that of governing (Herrschens)”.18 While Beck con-
tests this paradigm, he does so because, in his opinion, globalisation has superseded it, 
not because this doctrinal framework misses the mark as to the nature of legal place as 
such. For Beck, no less than for the strand of public lawyers he criticizes, a territory is 
an empty, homogeneous “surface” that functions as the stage for acts of legal power. 
  This abstract conception of territoriality is linked to a second assumption con-
cerning the nature of its unity. Jellinek voices the general opinion when he states that 
“only one state can deploy its power on one and the same territory”.19 What, however, 
determines a space as “one and the same” territory? 
Two different answers to this question can be discerned in Beck’s analyses. The 
first is no doubt the answer he would himself provide if he were explicitly confronted 
                                                   
15 For an influential social geographical inquiry into place, see Yi-fu Tuan, Topophilia (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974); for philosophical reappraisals of place see Jeff Malpas, “Finding Place: 
Spatiality, Locality, and Subjectivity”, in Andrew Light & Jonathan M. Smith (eds.), Philosophies of Place 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), p. 21, Jeff Malpas, Place and Experience: A Philosophi-
cal Topography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place: A 
Philosophical History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), and Edward S. Casey, Getting Back 
into Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Place-World (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1993), albeit that neither of these authors deals with the structure of legal place as such. There is as 
far as I know but one legal philosopher, Carl Schmitt, who has dealt extensively with legal place. In his late 
work, Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1950), 
Schmitt addresses this issue under the epithet Ordnung und OrtungOrder and Emplacement. I plan to 
critically engage with Schmitt’s thinking on the placial character of legal order in a separate paper, amongst 
other reasons because his challenge to liberal thinking (about Europe) is, to my mind, far more profound 
than has generally been recognized hitherto. 
16 Beck, Demokratie, supra note 4, at 15. 
17 Paul Laband, Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1911), p. 190. 
18 Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Kronberg: Verlag Athenäum, 1976 [1851]), p. 394. See 
also Carl Friedrich von Gerber, Grundzüge des deutschen Staatsrechts (Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz, 
1880). p. 66. 
19 Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, supra note 18, at 396. 
  7with the question. Contrasting territoriality to transnational social spaces, he asserts 
that in the latter “geographical and social proximity do not coincide”.20 Implicitly, then, 
he takes for granted that the unity of a state territory is geographically determined, 
hence that the unity involved in referring to “one and the same territory” is geographi-
cal. Beck is entirely consistent with this view when he argues that the European Union 
is a transnational space, rather than a place, to the extent that “Europe is not a geo-
graphical but an imagined area”.21 It is indeed the case that a geographical criterion of 
unity will not work for Europe, as we have seen at the outset of this paper. The problem 
is, however, that a geographical criterion does not work for Beck’s “territorial state” ei-
ther: Ceuta and Melilla, French Polynesia and New Caledonia, and the Falklands have 
already been mentioned; but think also, for example, of the United States. None of the 
apposite countries is a geographical unity (assuming we can at all make sense of this 
perplexing expression), yet each of these countries indisputably claims to be a territo-
rial unity, and is prepared to defend its integrity wherever it may be compromised. The 
unity of a territory never has beenand never will bereducible to geographical unity. 
  The second answer appears in an aside criticizing a territorially bound ethics: 
“there is no return to a morality that ends at one’s own (the national) garden-fence”.22 
Despite the disparaging metaphor, this fragment is chiefly interesting because it is one 
of only two passages in which Beck allows himself to relinquish the disinterested posi-
tion of the researcher speaking about a territory, to write from the interested position 
of the member of a (national) community who stands in relation to a territory. From 
this perspective, a territory appears as the community’s own place. He returns to this 
perspective a few lines further on, asserting that the contemporary moral state of affairs 
of a world society is characterized by “precisely those persons and questions with which 
we really have (or want to have) nothing to do, [yet] break into our inner space and 
cannot simply be sent away or expelled”.23 Hence, an inside and an own place are two 
sides of the same coin. Notice that the positions inside and outside a territory are quali-
tatively rather than merely quantitatively different: an inside is favoured over what lies 
outside. A territory is not simply a tract of land within the homogeneous continuum of 
a global expanse. Paradoxically, the abstract view on territoriality espoused by modern 
Western public lawyers, and uncritically accepted by Beck, is incapable of explaining 
what determines territoriality, whether national or otherwise, as a legal place. 
Crucially, the claim to an own place does not mean that a community lays claim 
to a territory as its “property”; instead, any such property relation is only possible on 
the ground of a more fundamental, reflexive relation. Consider, in this respect, the 
proem to Communication 459 of 1998, in which the European Commission delineates 
the main contours of an action plan to implement the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice: 
The concept enshrines at European Union level the essence of what we derive from our de-
mocratic traditions and what we understand by the rule of law. The common values underly-
                                                   
20 See the citation germane to footnote 5 supra. And, agreeing with Luhmann, Beck notes that 
“the borders of the social system society have long ago ceased to coincide with geographical borders . . . In 
most social subsystems, communication takes place beyond state borders”. See Beck, Demokratie, supra 
note 4, at 29. 
21 Beck, Globalization, supra note 3, at 156. 
22 Beck, Demokratie, supra note 4, at 47. 
23 Id., at 48 (emphasis added). 
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ples of the modern democracies of the European Union.24 
Notice, pending a more detailed analysis of this passage in Section IV, that the Com-
mission raises several claims in this compact statement: it holds that the Area gives le-
gal expression to a pre-existent placeEurope, that this pre-existent place is a common 
place, and, finally, that “we, Europeans” can call this place “our own” by virtue of 
shared values. In a nutshell, the aforementioned passage offers a blueprint of the proc-
ess in which the European Union takes up a relation to place by relating to itself and, 
conversely, relates to itself in the process of relating to place. The rejoinder to Beck 
has to be that in closing off an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice as its own place, 
the European Union is not only saying what it is; it is also and above all engaging in the 
ongoing reflexive process of constituting itself as a “we”, as a legal community. 
  It is significant that, immediately after this passage, the Commission adds the 
following: 
The three notions of freedom, security and justice are closely interlinked. Freedom loses 
much of its meaning if it cannot be enjoyed in a secure environment and with the full backing 
of a system of justice in which all Union citizens and residents can have confidence. These 
three inseparable concepts have one common denominatorpeopleand one cannot be 
achieved in full without the other two. Maintaining the right balance between them must be 
the guiding thread for Union action.25 
As mentioned at the outset of this paper, critics have been quick to note that a “right 
balance” between these concepts is wanting. Although this critique is no doubt correct 
as far as it goes, the foregoing analysis shows that it overlooks the essential point: the 
European Commission asserts that freedom, security and justice are tied to the reflex-
ive process by which the Union lays claim to a place of its own and enforces this 
claim. 
This strong claim must now occupy our attention, as it considerably raises the 
ante, both politically and philosophically. Does not accepting the view that the Euro-
pean Union’s territorial unity involves a claim to an “own” place entail making of the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice an instrument at the service of a “politics of ex-
clusion”, or what amounts to the same, a “politics of identity”? Is this not what is ulti-
mately at stake in Beck’s caveat about ideological justifications of closed spaces? 
To address this pressing issue, I propose to unpack the Commission’s assertion 
into three separate but internally related sets of questions: 
(1) How are we to interpret the mutual implication between an inside and an 
own place with respect to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? What are the im-
plications of this mutual implication for the claim that place is ingredient to freedom, 
security and justice? (Section III) 
(2) Not only is there a mutual implication between an inside and an own place 
but this mutual implication is also constituted reflexively: the European Union closes 
itself off. Here is our second set of questions: How does the self-closure of the European 
Union into an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice come about? What are the impli-
cations of this self-closure for the Union’s claim that the Area is its own place? (Section 
IV) 
                                                   
24 “Towards an area of freedom, security and justice”, in Bulletin of the European Union 7/8 
(1998), p. 152 [hereinafter referred to as Comm. 459/98]. 
25 Id., at 152. 
  9(3) How, finally, are we to interpret the primacy of security over freedom and 
justice in the context of the Union’s claim to territorial unity? In what way does the 
preservation of territorial unity impinge on the concept and the practice of what the 
Commission, in Communication 459/98, calls “European public order”? (Section V) 
 
 
III. A Legal Topology of the Area 
The immanent critique of Beck’s sociology of globalisation yielded a fundamental in-
sight into the structure of legal place: in closing itself off as an inside with respect to an 
outside, a community posits a place as its own and vice versa. An inside and a claim to 
an own place are mutually implicating terms. How, then, are we to interpret this mu-
tual implication with respect to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? Securing a 
correct approach to this question requires that we be constantly on guard against the 
temptation to reduce it to a geographical problem. Although all commentators would 
immediately agree that the European Union has an inside and an outside, most would 
add that this is so because this legal community does not comprise the whole surface of 
the earth. In contrast, a legal order that encompasses or aspires to encompass the en-
tire world, e.g. the World Trade Organization, would, it seems, have no outsidehence 
no inside. By the same token, the determination of the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice as the European Union’s own place would express no more than the contingent 
fact that there are foreign places situated outside the Union’s sphere of validity, such 
that “own” and “foreign” denote different positions within a single continuum: the 
earth. Although plausible at first glance, this approach succumbs to the temptation of 
interpreting these concepts as geographical notions. Instead, their meaning must be 
elucidated legally. What is required, in other words, is a legal topology, an inquiry that 
exhibits the main features that determine the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice as 
a legal place. 
 
1. Inside and Outside 
Consider, in this light, the following provisions of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community: 
Article 61: In order to establish progressively an area of freedom, security and justice, the 
Council shall adopt: 
(a)   . . . measures aimed at ensuring the free movement of persons in accordance with 
article 14, in conjunction with directly related flanking measures with respect to ex-
ternal border controls, asylum and immigration . . . and measures to prevent and 
combat crime . . . 
(b)  other measures in the fields of asylum, immigration and safeguarding the rights of 
nationals of third countries, in accordance with the provisions of Article 63;  . . . 
Article 63: The Council . . . shall . . . adopt: 
1. measures on asylum . . .; 
2. measures on refugees and displaced persons . . .; 
3. measures on immigration policy within the following areas: 
(a)  conditions of entry and residence, and standards on procedures for the issue by 
Member States of long-term visas and residence permits, including those for the 
purpose of family reunion, 
  10(b)  illegal immigration and illegal residence, including repatriation of illegal resi-
dents.26 
Here, drawing on these Articles, are the main topographical features of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice: 
a) The territorial unity of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice derives 
from the claim that the Area is a common place. In the words of Communication 
459/98, “[t]he common values underlying the objective of an area of freedom, security 
and justice are indeed longstanding principles of the modern democracies of the Euro-
pean Union”. The Commission claims that this area is a common place by virtue of em-
bodying shared values.27 A common place involves two correlative dimensions. The first 
is normative, and concerns a claim about the common interest of the European Union. 
To be common, an interest must be bounded, and this means that a legal order neces-
sarily selects certain values to grant them legal protection and discards other values as 
legally irrelevant.28 This is tantamount to identifying the values on which the European 
Union confers legal protection as its own values. The second dimension is physical, in-
sofar as the claim to normative commonality raised by a legal order is determined by 
means of boundaries that establish what counts as legally emplaced and misplaced be-
haviourabout which more later. Importantly, this physical dimension is not territori-
ality itself, as though values were superimposed on a territory that merely functions as 
the precondition of a legal order. Instead, values are ingredient to a territory as such; 
indeed, space becomes the Area of Freedom, Security and Justicethe European Un-
ion’s own placewhen normatively mediated in terms of values deemed to be legally 
relevant. In contrast with the reifying dualism of the legal doctrine, a theory of territo-
riality that is attentive to its specific mode of appearance is resolutely monistic: only by 
abstraction can the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice be analysed into its physical 
and normative dimensions. Accordingly, and explicitly contesting the legal doctrine’s 
untoward conflation of territory with its physical dimension, I shall refer hereinafter to 
territory as the concrete unity of both dimensions.29 
This critical reformulation of the concept of territory casts the vexing notion of 
“divided” sovereignty in a new light. A leading legal philosopher vigorously defends a 
position close to that of Beck when noting that “absolute or unitary sovereignty is en-
tirely absent from the legal and political setting of the European Community. Neither 
                                                   
26 The forthcoming analysis does not discuss the provisions for the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice contemplated in what, at the time of writing this paper, remains a draft Treaty establishing a Euro-
pean Constitution. Nonetheless, the analysis, by virtue of its generality, could easily link the apposite pro-
visions of the (draft) Treaty to the fundamental placial features of the Area as outlined hereinafter. More-
over, I concentrate on Title IV ECT rather than on Title VI TEU. 
27 To be sure, legislation concerning the policy fields covered by Title IV ECT has barely gotten off 
the ground. At the time of writing this paper, only Directives 2003/9/EC and 2003/86/EC, on minimum 
standards for the reception of asylum seekers and on the right to family reunification, have been enacted; 
to boot, the European Parliament seems set to bring this Directive before the European Court of Justice on 
procedural and material grounds. But the point of the matter is that giving legislative shape to the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice presupposes that commonality is intrinsic to the very notion of a legal place. 
28 See my article, “Dialectic and Revolution: Confronting Kelsen and Gadamer on Legal Interpre-
tation”, in Cardozo Law Review, 24 (2003), p. 769. 
29 This approach is akin to that of Hannah Arendt, who notes that territory “is a political and a le-
gal concept, and not merely a geographical term. It relates not so much, and not primarily, to a piece of 
land as to the space between individuals in a group whose members are bound to, and at the same time 
separated and protected from, each other by all kinds of relationships, based on a common language, relig-
ion, a common history, customs, and laws”. See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the 
Banality of Evil (London: Penguin, 1994 [1963]), p. 262.  
  11politically nor legally is any member state in possession of ultimate power over its own 
internal affairs”.30 Plainly, however, this view rests on the reduction of territoriality to 
its physical dimension, such that one and the same territory is held to function as the 
precondition of two legal orders. However much at loggerheads, the emphatic defence 
by public lawyers such as Laband and Jellinek of the “impermeability” of the state, and 
the no less emphatic defence of “divided sovereignty” by contemporary public lawyers 
coincide in taking for granted that a territory is merely the material substrate of acts of 
power. If, however, one recognizes that a territory is the concrete unity of normative 
and physical dimensions, then the implication can only be that there is not one territory 
as the basis of two legal ordersthe legal orders of a Member State and of the Euro-
pean Unionbut rather two different, irreducible territories. More subtly, the legal 
autonomy of the European Union vis-à-vis its Member States implies that, for reasons 
very different to those contemplated by Jellinek, it is indeed the case that “only one 
[polity] can deploy its power on one and the same territory”. For if territoriality con-
joins normative and physical dimensions, then it is analytically true that the unity of a 
territory is ingredient to the unity a legal order claims for itself and vice versa. 31 
b) The external borders of the Member States give rise to the distinction be-
tween an own territory and foreign territories. Notice, however, that this distinction is 
by no means geographical, as assumed by the legal doctrine, but normative through 
and through: at issue is the distinction between legal and illegal sojourn in the Euro-
pean Union. For the purposes of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the external 
borders of the Member States illustrate the two basic modes by which a legal order 
organizes placiality. On the one hand, citizens of the Union and legally resident third-
country nationals abide in the area, in the twofold sense of abiding in a place and abid-
ing by the law. They are “emplaced”, located where they ought to be. On the other hand, 
illegal migrants trespass, cross over, in the double sense of becoming “misplaced” and 
crossing the law. The trespasser relates to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in 
the form of not-where-s/he-ought-to-be, and is, as such, amenable to (detention and) 
repatriation. 
c) The act by which the European Union closes itself off from the rest of the 
world as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice also links it to the rest of the world, 
which appears as the place where, unless authorized to enter the European Union, 
third-country nationals ought to be. In other words, the external borders of the Mem-
ber Stateshence the positions inside and outside of these bordersare intelligible as 
a result of the process whereby, positing itself as a territorial unity, the European Union 
co-posits the unity of the legal place-world to which it belongs.32 By laying down exter-
nal borders, the European Union includes itself and what it excludes in an encompass-
ing unity of places. The European Union is not a legal enclave in what is otherwise a 
geographical world; the European Union can only take up a legal place in the world be-
cause, from the very beginning, it co-posits the world as an ensemble of legal places. 
The European Union does not, therefore, restrict its claim to commonality to the Area 
                                                   
30 Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Com-
monwealth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 132. 
31 For a critical examination of the presuppositions governing a great deal of the contemporary 
debate about sovereignty, see my articles “Sovereignty and the Institutionalization of Normative Order”, in 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 21 (2001), pp. 165–180, and “Sovereignty and Representation in the 
European Union”, in Neil Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart, 2003), pp. 87-114. 
32 I borrow the expression “place-world” from Edward Casey. See Casey, Getting Back into Place, 
supra note 15. 
  12of Freedom, Security and Justice: by closing itself off as a legal place, the Union also 
and necessarily claims to take up its place in a common world, such that all legally rele-
vant behaviour has its own place within the distribution of places available in the legal 
place-world. 
d) The paradoxical inclusion and exclusion that gives rise to the Area of Free-
dom, Security and Justice comes about at the external borders of Member States, which 
simultaneously close off and open up the European Union. This openness in closure 
manifests itself in border crossings. All the “individual measures” that could be imag-
ined in the framework of Title IV ECT are ways of regulating border crossings and, 
therefore, of dealing with this paradox. In particular, both “restrictive” and “liberal” 
migration policies rest on and are called forth by the structure of closure/openness 
characteristic of legal borders. No simple either/or situation is at stake in such policies: 
a liberal migration policy is no less a way of determining how the European Union 
closes itself off from the rest of the world than a restrictive migration policy a way of 
establishing how the Union opens itself up to the world. 
e) By closing itself off as an internal market, the European Union co-posits the 
rest of the legal place-world as an external market; the European Union anticipates the 
legal place-world as a market. So, in the very process of co-positing an outside with re-
spect to its inside, the European Union asserts that all behaviour relevant to the Euro-
pean Union ought to find its place on one or the other side of the divide between an in-
ternal and an external market. More pointedly, the very distinction between legal and 
illegal border-crossings of third country nationals rests on the presupposition that the 
territorial unity of the EU is intelligible with respect to the unity of the market and vice 
versa. This presupposition of intelligibility is called into question when the external 
borders of the Member States become the locus of crossings that not merely trespass 
those borders but also transgress them. Indeed, the “individual measures” relating to 
migration policy in the framework of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice have 
been governed, implicitly or explicitly, by the distinction between political asylum seek-
ers and economic migrants. The migratory fluxes reaching the European Union chal-
lenge, transgress, this principle for regulating border-crossings, and with it, the qualifi-
cation of economically motivated border-crossings as illegal. Such border-crossings 
make manifest an outside of the European Union in a strong sense of the word, that is, 
a “where” that is elsewherea “heterotopia”, as Michel Foucault calls this kind of 
place.33 Indeed, precisely because the European Union takes up a place in the world by 
closing itself off as an internal market in which freedom, security and justice are to 
reign, challenges to the Union’s external borders not only call into question what the 
Union claims to be its own place but alsoand literallythe place it claims for itself in 
the world. In this strong sense, an outside calls into question the Union’s claim that the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is a common place within a common world. 
  f) This second, strong manifestation of the outside of a legal space, can also re-
veal itself in the transgression of an “internal” boundary that stakes out a legally pro-
                                                   
33 In a well-known article, Foucault distinguishes between utopias and heterotopias. In contrast to 
utopias, which are fundamentally unreal spaces, whether they present society in a perfected form or its 
inverted image (anti-utopias), heterotopias are “outside of all places, even though it may be possible to 
indicate their location in reality”. Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces”, in Diacritics 24 (1986), p. 16. Typical 
for modernity, he argues, are “heterotopias of deviation: those in which individuals whose behavior is devi-
ant in relation to the required mean or norm are placed”(Id., at 25). Examples of such heterotopias are, in 
his view, rest homes, psychiatric hospitals and prisons. 
  13tected place within the European Union. The demonstrations and disturbances attend-
ing the Intergovernmental Conference convened to sign the Amsterdam Treaty elo-
quently illustrate this point. On the evening of 15 June 1997, “a group of 300 demon-
strators gathered outside ‘Café Vrankrijk,’ a well-known squat in Amsterdam, with the 
aim of holding a peaceful protest outside police headquarters supporting others already 
being held by the police. All 300 were eventually detained before they ever reached 
their  destination . . .”34 The question is this: where were the demonstrators coming 
from? The squat they came from is an ambiguous place. For the Dutch legal order, Café 
Vrankrijk is a building occupied without right or title or payment of rent; the squatters 
are trespassers amenable to eviction, and the squat a “misplace”. But it is more than 
that: by entering the building, the squatters also transgress a legal boundary, calling 
into question what counts as being in place. If trespass entails misplacement, trans-
gression entails displacement, that is, laying claim to a place for which there is no place 
in a legal order. Café Vrankrijk is such a non-place in the distribution of legal places 
called forth by a capitalist economy. By gathering around Café Vrankrijk, before head-
ing towards police headquarters, the demonstrators take up their place in this non-
place, transforming it into a non-place inserted in the European internal market. The 
squat the demonstrators are coming from is inside the European Unionand outside 
of it. 
If the demonstrators come from elsewhere, where are they going? To police 
headquarters, we are told, where their fellow demonstrators are being held. Having 
been shut up in police headquarters, these demonstrators, so the police avers, have 
been put-into-legal-place. Notice the inverted symmetry: whereas the squatters are 
misplaced, the arrested demonstrators are in place. For the law, the squat and police 
headquarters exemplify the two modes of place intelligible to a legal order, namely a 
“misplace” and an own place. Yet, for the demonstrators, the opposite inverted symme-
try is at stake: the squatters are in place, and the arrested demonstrators misplaced; 
whereas the squat is an own place, police headquarters is a “misplace”. By heading to-
wards police headquarters to demonstrate against the detention of their companions, 
they challenge a legal border, the concrete (in the twofold sense of the term) walls of 
police headquarters. By heading towards police headquarters, they contest its legal 
qualification as an own place. By heading towards police headquarters, they connect 
this place to the squat, uniting both into a single distribution of places. By heading to-
wards police headquarters, the demonstrators are leaving, going elsewhereoutside 
the European Union. 
This Section began by noting that an inside and an own place are two sides of 
the same coin. A legal topology of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice confirms 
this insight, but also suggests that these terms are correlated in two different ways. In a 
first sense, the determination of inside as an own place goes together with that of out-
side as a foreign place, such that both belong together in a single distribution of places. 
This sense of the inside/outside distinction is contingent, for it refers to legal orders 
that are “limited” in space, as the legal doctrine puts it. In a second sense, the determi-
nation of inside as an own place is correlative to that of an outside as a strange place, as 
a place that does not fit into a single distribution of places together with the own place. 
In this second sense, the concept of an “unlimited” territory is a contradiction in terms: 
to be legal, a territory is perforce bounded, including one that has a global reach. Beck 
                                                   
34 “Netherlands: Hundreds held during Summit”, in Statewatch Bulletin 7 (1997) 3. 
  14notwithstanding, every legal order has an outside in this strong sense, whether latent or 
actual. Crucially, these two manifestations of exteriority do not necessarily coincide: the 
place from which a foreigner comes, when entering the European Union, need not be 
strange; conversely, a strange place need not be foreign: it can irrupt from within what 
the European Union calls its own place. 
 
2. Citizenship and Territoriality 
The introduction to this paper espoused the thesis that one of the most challenging po-
litical and philosophical claims raised by the Amsterdam Treaty, a claim recently reit-
erated by the draft Constitution for Europe, is that place is ingredient to the very possi-
bility and concrete actualisation of freedom, security and freedom. Does the foregoing 
topology of the Area bear out this view? 
At first blush, this idea is uncontroversial and even trite, hardly a “challenge” at 
all: it simply expresses the fact that by closing itself off as an inside over and against an 
outside, the European Union continues to depend on the territorial paradigm of the na-
tion-state. Indeed, no exceptional acumen is required to see why, in the context of the 
European Union, freedom, security and justice presuppose this legal community’s terri-
torial unity. Freedom, as the free movement of persons, depends on the boundary that 
closes off the internal market from an external market. The “persons” involved are, to 
be sure, citizens and legally resident third country nationals, individuals who abide in 
the Area. Security, too, is bounded; in the Commission’s words, “[t]he full benefits of 
any area of freedom will never be enjoyed unless they are exercised in an area where 
people can feel safe and secure”.35 Obviously, the Commission does not make security 
extensive to illegal immigrants or to those who engage in transnational criminal activi-
ties. On the contrary, security is all about enforcing the external borders of the Euro-
pean Union against trespass. Finally, the European Commission plays down the high-
flown word “justice” and settles instead for the more down-to-earth “system of justice”, 
arguing that realizing an Area of Justice requires “both access to justice and full judicial 
cooperation among Member States”.36 The point of the matter is, of course, that access 
to justice must be taken literally, for the judicial system is made available to citizens of 
the Union and to legally resident third country nationals, that is, to those who abide in 
the Area of Justice. 
  Importantly, territorial unity is not only instrumental to freedom, security and 
justice but also to citizenship. In the Commission’s words, “[t]hese three inseparable 
concepts have one common denominatorpeopleand one cannot be achieved in full 
without the other two”.37 At the same time that the Commission’s usage of the term 
“people” embraces two specific categories of personsUnion citizens and legally resi-
dent third country nationalsit masks the essential point that freedom, security and 
justice presuppose the fundamental distinction between political equality and inequal-
ity, between those who are and those who are not members of the community. For, de-
spite its bland inclusiveness, “people” is by no means synonymous with “human be-
ings”, as though the European Union were about promoting universal human equality; 
on the contrary, the European Commission rules out such equality to be able to identify 
the usufructuaries of freedom, security and justice: the citizens of European Union and, 
                                                   
35 Comm. 459/98, supra note 24, at 155. 
36 Id., at 156. 
37 Id., at 152. 
  15when deemed appropriate by this community of citizens, third country nationals. Ac-
cordingly, although all three values are, or at least ought to be, on equal footing, all 
three are rooted in the principle of justice, namely treating those who are equal equally, 
and those who are unequal unequally. In turn, the principle of justice can only get off 
the ground and become the guiding principle of the Area of Freedom, Security and Jus-
tice if the differentiation between political equality and inequality is linked to a closure 
that differentiates a territory as an inside over and against an outside: European citi-
zenship is emplaced citizenship. 
Although politically of great consequence, none of this is conceptually heady 
stuff. For a sociology of globalisation, it all follows from the contingent fact that the 
European Union continues to pay tribute to the territorial paradigm of the nation-state. 
Alternatively, on a reading that seems politically more charitable and conceptually 
more demanding, although the Union has not yet succeeded in wresting free of the ter-
ritorial citizenship of the nation-state, European citizenship, as regulated in Articles 17-
22 ECT, marks an intermediate stage on the road toward deterritorialised “world citi-
zenship”.38 European citizenship prefigures a phase in human history in which political 
equality, finally liberated from territoriality, would be identical to human equality. 
Globalization, it seems, gives the nay to the thesis, intimated at the outset of this paper, 
that freedom, security and justice are necessarily territorially bound. 
Beck’s objection is only plausible as long as one assumes that the emplacement 
of freedom, security and justice, no less than of citizenship, is tied to the first sense of 
inside and outside discussed earlier, namely the determination of an inside as an own 
place, in contradistinction to foreign places. But this assumption is mistaken. To see 
why, let us consider a hypothetical world-state. Regardless of the organizational princi-
ple that were to be adopted when founding a world-state, this novel legal community 
would have to claim that it holds sway over a common place. In this it would be no dif-
ferent from a nation-state or the European Union; the claim is constitutive for a legal 
community as such. In other words, if the world were ever to become the territory of a 
state, it would not be simply the material substrate or precondition of a legal or-
derthe “earth”, as one might call this substratebut rather the concrete unity of the 
normative and physical dimensions that render it intelligible as a common place. In ef-
fect, a world-state would arise in the process of selecting certain values as worthy of le-
gal protection and setting boundaries that define what counts as emplacedand mis-
placedbehaviour. Although freedom would no longer be tied to boundaries that dif-
ferentiate between the world community’s own territory and foreign territories, a 
world-state could not realize freedom, in its basic manifestation as freedom of move-
ment, without boundaries that define legal emplacement and misplacement. The same 
holds for security: protection against breaches of legality involves enforcement of the 
boundaries that determine where behaviour ought to take place. If, finally, one defines 
global justice, analogously to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, as the right 
granted to the citizens of a world-state to avail themselves of the judicial system in their 
daily transactions, this franchise presupposes that the world citizen is committed, qua 
citizen, to the values the world-state claims to be common, hence to conserving the ter-
ritorial integrity of this community by respecting the boundaries that establish what 
counts as being in-legal-place. 
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ship could by no means be identified with universal human equality. Citizenship in a 
world-state would institute political equality, which, as Arendt correctly contends, “is 
not given us, but is the result of human organization insofar as it is guided by the prin-
ciple of justice. We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the 
strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights”.39 Because this 
decision involves selecting certain values as worthy of legal protection and discarding 
others as irrelevant, the institution of political equality in a world-state inevitably opens 
up the possibility of political inequality, such that “world citizenship” could ultimately 
be withdrawn from individuals who, appealing to values that have been cast aside by 
the world community as legally irrelevant, radically contest its claim to instituting a 
common place where freedom, security and justice are to reign. The realization of 
“global” freedom, security and justice is unimaginable unless the “world” becomes a 
place, a bounded region, which is another way of saying that “world citizenship” is nec-
essarily emplaced citizenship. 
In short, although it is certainly the case that the European Union is a contin-
gent manifestation of the territorial boundedness of freedom, security and justice, the 
territorial boundedness of these values is not itself contingent. Relatedly, it would of 
course have been possible for the Amsterdam Treaty to make no reference at all to an 
Area, announcing instead that it aspired to realize freedom, security and justice tout 
court. Nor, for that matter, is there an a priori reason that compels grouping these 
three policy fields into a single project.40 But the very possibility and concrete realiza-
tion of these values, whether separately or jointly, depends on boundaries that deter-
mine the territorial unity of a legal community, be it a nation-state, the European Un-
ion or a hypothetical world-state. 
Hence, the European Union emplaces freedom, security and justice not because 
it is a legal community “limited” in space, but because it is a legal community. Despite 
their differences, a deeper parallel emerges between the European Union and a hypo-
thetical world-state: in bothand all other imaginablelegal communities, the realiza-
tion of freedom, security and justice relies on boundaries that determine what counts as 
being in-legal-place. This is not to deny, of course, that the external borders of the Un-
ion play a vital role in the manner in which it emplaces this triad of values. But the Un-
ion’s external borders play this role to the extent that they are a manifestation of the 
divide no legal community can do without: emplacement and misplacement. The exter-
nal borders of the Union only reveal a strong form of externality when they are trans-
gressed, that is, when what counts as being in one’s own place in the distribution of 
places made available by the legal place-world is called into question, as is the case with 
stateless persons who do not have an own place to which they can be repatriated. For 
the same reason, as the demonstrations around Café Vrankrijk show, the emplacement 
of freedom, security and justice realized by the European Union can also be contested 
from within its external borders. In this strong sense of an outside, all the boundaries 
                                                   
39  Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1951), p. 301 
[hereinafter cited as Totalitarianism]. 
40 In a perceptive article, Neil Walker points out that there is no thematic, historical or institu-
tional coherence that justifies bringing together the issues dealt with in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice. Coherence, he suggests, is primarily a matter of policy-making and of constitutional design. See 
Neil Walker, “In Search of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A Constitutional Odyssey”, forthcom-
ing in Neil Walker (ed.), Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (2004). 
  17that establish what counts as being legally-in-place in the Union are its external 
boundaries; the external borders of the Union, in the sense of Article 61(a) ECT, are but 
a species thereof. The transgression of these borders reveals an outside such that free-
dom, security and justice appear as located elsewhere than in the European Un-
ionand elsewhere than in the legal place-world in which it takes up its place. 
 
 
IV. A Legal Topogenesis of the Area 
Let us briefly take stock of where we stand before moving on. The central thesis of Sec-
tion II is that the realization of freedom, security and justice is tied to the reflexive 
process by which the Union lays claim to a place of its own and enforces this claim. Sec-
tion III concentrates on disentangling two distinct senses in which the Union claims 
that the Area is its own place and showing how this claim impinges on the emplace-
ment of freedom, security and justice. Now, we must turn to the other part of this the-
sis, the self-closure of the Union into an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. This 
passage involves the shift from a static to a dynamic perspective. Indeed, it has been 
necessary, in view of sketching out a legal topology of the Area, to take for granted that 
the Union’s self-closure has already come about. In other words, Section III construes 
“emplacement” as a noun, as the location of something, neglecting its verbal form as 
the act of locating something or putting it into place. Accordingly, a legal topology must 
now make way for a legal topogenesis: what is the nature of the act whereby the Euro-
pean Union closes itself by positing the boundaries of the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice? 
 
1. The Self-Closure of the European Union 
Even a cursory reading of the Treaties suggests that this act is reflexive. Consider, to 
begin with, Article 1 TEU: “By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish 
among themselves a European Union, hereinafter called ‘the Union’” (emphasis added). 
This reflexive formulation is no less prominent in Article 1 ECT: “By this Treaty, the 
High Contracting parties establish among themselves a European Community” (em-
phasis added). Nor is it coincidental, finally, that this reflexive formulation resurfaces 
in Article 2 TEU: “The Union shall set itself the following objectives: . . . – to maintain 
and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice  .  .  .” (emphasis 
added). If Articles 1 and 2 TEU are merged together and formulated in the first person 
plural form, they read as follows: “By this Treaty, we, the High Contracting Parties, 
agree to establish, maintain and develop among ourselves an Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice . . .” It is fairly straightforward why, in line with these Articles, the Union 
closes itself by staking out the Area as its own place. In effect, closure has a reflexive 
structure because a community of individuals is deemed to be both the subject that cre-
ates the Area and its beneficiary, and this is simply another way of saying that the Area 
is the European Union’s own place. 
But this remains a highly general and abstract explanation that says little or 
nothing about how this self-closure comes about. In fact, closer inspection indicates 
that a latent riddle governs the reflexive formulation of Articles 1 and 2 TEU. Arendt, in 
the passage cited toward the end of the foregoing Section, inadvertently discloses the 
nature of this riddle: “We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group 
on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights” (emphasis 
  18added). At the same time that Arendt’s observation calls attention to the reflexivity in-
herent to the foundational act of a community, it passes over in silence the decisive 
question: who belongs to the “we” that decide to band together and grant themselves 
mutual rights? If, as she correctly notes, “equality is not given us, but is the result of 
human organization insofar as it is guided by the principle of justice”, how is the prin-
ciple of justice identified that allows of selecting the politically equal, and differentiat-
ing them from the politically unequal? Clearly, the measure of political equality cannot 
itself be the object of a decision among political equals, for this leads to an infinite re-
gress.41 How then can a manifold of individuals at all call itself a “we” and, as a collec-
tive self, become the subject and beneficiary of a legal order? How is the self-
constitution of a community at all possible? 
  This is no purely theoretical conundrum, far removed from Articles 1 and 2 
TEU. Romano Prodi’s plaintive question at the summit of Helsinki in 1999, “Where 
does Europe end?”42, reveals that the issue of membership is at the core of these Arti-
cles. Yet Prodi’s question, by suggesting that this issue only materializes at the final 
stages of European integration, conceals that it arose at the outset of the European pro-
ject. If one rereads the introductory passages of Communication 459/98 with this prob-
lem in mind, one cannot help being struck by a circularity governing the Commission’s 
reasoning: 
The three notions of freedom, security and justice are closely interlinked. Freedom loses 
much of its meaning if it cannot be enjoyed in a secure environment and with the full backing 
of a system of justice in which all Union citizens and residents can have confidence. These 
three inseparable concepts have one common denominatorpeopleand one cannot be 
achieved in full without the other two. 
The gist of the passage is that exclusion from (and inclusion in) the Area is justified be-
cause this territory is the own place of European citizens; yet, to begin with, exclusion 
(and its attendant inclusion) gives rise to European citizens and their own place. Flying 
in the face of Arendt’s admonition about equality being the outcome of a collective deci-
sion, the Commission effectively asserts that territorial unity is “given us”. It would be a 
mistake to immediately draw the conclusion that this circularity is vicious. Does it not 
rather intimate that the regress confronting the problem of membership in the Euro-
pean Union can only be avoided if the act that posits the Union’s boundaries presup-
poses, rather than justifies, its territorial unity? Would not the aforementioned passage 
attest to the productive character of the Commission’s reasoning, such that a manifold 
of individuals can only become a “we” by way of a foundational act that presupposes 
that this manifold is already a unity, a “we”? 
Consider, once again, the passage immediately preceding the Commission’s cir-
cular reasoning in Communication 459/98: 
The concept enshrines at European Union level the essence of what we derive from our de-
mocratic traditions and what we understand by the rule of law. The common values underly-
                                                   
41 I am indebted here to Bert van Roermund, who has exposed a comparable problem in Jürgen 
Habermas’s discourse principle. See Bert van Roermund, Law, Narrative and Reality: An Essay in Inter-
cepting Politics (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), p. 151. He links this problem to collective 
reflexivity in a powerful article, “First-Person Plural Legislature: Political Reflexivity and Representation”, 
in Philosophical Explorations 6 (2003), pp. 235-250. 
42 Cited in Xavier Vidal-Folch, “Los límites del club Europa: La futura ampliación hasta 28 países 
abre el debate hasta dónde llega Europa y dónde debe terminar la UE”, El País, 14 December 1999. 
  19ing the objective of an area of freedom, security and justice are indeed longstanding princi-
ples of the modern democracies of the European Union. 
In light of the fact that the city of Amsterdam was the locus of sizeable demonstrations 
against the signing of the very Treaty that ushered in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, it is tempting to dismiss this passage as an exercise in political cynicism. But to 
leave it at that would be to miss its fundamental significance for the topogenesis of the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Indeed, closer scrutiny of this passage reveals 
that a temporal paradox governs the process of positing the boundaries that give rise to 
the Area’s territorial unity: the Commission claims that the boundaries that close off 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice into the Union’s own place had been drawn 
prior to the Amsterdam Treaty, hence that these boundaries simply obtain legal ex-
pression in this Treaty. 
The Commission’s move is by no means unique; it repeats the gesture that gave 
rise to the European Community in the first place. The Preamble to the Treaty of Rome 
begins with a passage that has remained well nigh unchanged in all later treaties: the 
signatories to the Treaty of Rome are “determined to lay the foundations of an ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe”. Commentators do not tire of emphasizing 
that the Preamble refers to “peoples” in the plural, rather than to “people” in the singu-
lar, concluding that the European Community/Union is not a federal polity. This con-
clusion stands beyond doubt, as does the fact that European integration is not a zero-
sum game that confronts its participants with the choice of either merging into a single 
people or remaining separate peoples. Remarkably, however, commentators lose sight 
of the no less evident fact that by referring to an “ever closer union of European peo-
ples”, the Preamble not only posits unity as the future vanishing point of the integrative 
process but also claims that there already was a union at the time of laying its legal 
foundation in the Treaty of Rome, a community of peoples that, by virtue of their 
shared values, can go further together, engaging in a process of legal and economic in-
tegration. So, the circularity hidden in Communication 459/98 is of old stock: the 
wording of the Preamble implies that the Treaty of Rome does not initiate the commu-
nity of European peoples; the Treaty claims to build on a prior closure, providing this 
community with an institutional setting and specific goals.43 
Moreover, the Preamble to the Treaty of Rome views Europe as being itself al-
ready the product of an aboriginal scission that separates an undifferentiated space 
into two places: Europe and the rest of the world. The datable act of positing the Euro-
pean Community’s boundaries claims to derive from a closure lost in an irretrievable, 
undatable past. In its own way, the Preamble to the Treaty of Rome activates the basic 
cosmogonic principle: 
“[T]here is never merely only one place anywhere, not even in the process of creation. It is as 
if cosmogony respected the general rule enunciated by Aristotle in another connection: ‘the 
minimum number, strictly speaking, is two.’ To create in the first place is eo ipse to create 
two places”.44  
                                                   
  43 This temporal paradox, which becomes visible at moments of foundation, is operant in the 
European Court of Justice’s landmark case, Van Gend & Loos, a foundational moment par excellence. For 
an extended analysis of this ruling that inverts the tense of the expression acquis communautaire to ask 
what it takes to “acquire”to founda community, see my article “Acquiring a Community: Constituent 
Power and the Institution of European Legal Order”, in European Law Journal 9 (2003), pp. 433-450. 
  44 Casey, The Fate of Place, supra note 15, at 12. 
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and Justice, that the European Union includes itself and what it excludes in an encom-
passing distribution of places, the legal place-world. It now becomes clear that this fea-
ture of the Area leads back to its topogenesis: by evoking the primal cut that created 
“two places”, the Preamble not only assures the European Union of a place of its own, 
but also of a place within a single distribution of places, that is, within a world that is 
held to be common. The fundamental distinction between those who abide in the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice, and those who trespass its borders, is already pre-
pared in the Treaty of Rome, which only gives legal form, so it claims, to a cut that es-
tablished at the dawn of history who belongs where. Thus, the European Union’s terri-
torial unity and temporal unity are constituted in a mutually implicative process: the 
Union closes itself by “temporalising”, that is, by structuring past, present and future 
into the unity of a common history; conversely, the historical unity of the Union is spun 
in the ongoing process by which the Union emplaces itself, that is, stakes out a place of 
its own. 
Importantly, this topogenesis confirms the view that territoriality is concrete, as 
opposed to the abstract view of territoriality endorsed by the legal doctrine: the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice is held to be a common place because Europe is origi-
nally the common place, common by virtue of being, from the very beginning, a unity 
at once normative and physical, not an empty tract within the undifferentiated ex-
panse of the earth. The foundation of the European Union/Community is by no means 
an act that superimposes a normative “layer”, as it were, on what was originally an 
empty surface; the European Union, so claims its foundational act, gives legal expres-
sion to what is from the outset a territory, a concrete unity conjoining normative and 
physical dimensions.45 
All of this is at work in the apparently innocuous reflexive formulations of Arti-
cles 1 and 2 TEU, and 1 ECT. Returning to Arendt’s predicament, which is the predica-
ment of the self-constitution of a legal community, the Preamble to the Treaty of Rome 
reveals that power deploys a representational logic to be able to found a legal commu-
nity: “we become equal”as members of the European Unionon the basis of the 
claim that “we are already equal”as Europeans. A topogenetic inquiry reveals that 
Articles 1 TEU and 1 ECT mark the self-constitution of the European Un-
ion/Community in the two senses corresponding to the subjective and objective modes 
of the genitive: constitution by a collective self and constitution of a collective self. 
 
2. Absence in Presence 
All is well and good; but does this analysis not end up providing a conceptual alibi for 
the reification of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? Is not the circularity gov-
erning the Commission’s reasoning in Communication 459/98 exemplary for the hy-
postasis of territorial unity? A question posed earlier returns in acute form: if the Union 
cannot create this Area without presupposing that Europe is already closed, does this 
                                                   
45 A recent contribution to the problem of European identity illustrates this point and its linkage 
to the temporal paradox governing the process of self-closure: “In a strictly geographical sense, Europe 
does not have a precise border. The European idea has taken root in a common way of feeling, of thinking, 
of willing, that surpasses statal and technical limits . . .” See Michel Albert, Raymond Barre et. al., “La dy-
namique d’une riche identité commune, par un collectif de personalités européenes”, in Le Monde, 13 No-
vember 2003. 
  21not entail that the Area is but the privileged instrument by means of which legal power 
implements and enforces a politics of exclusion? 
An answer to this question hinges on the relation of legal power to territoriality. 
As has been noted heretofore, the legal doctrine reduces territoriality to a precondition 
of legal power; a territory is no more than the physical substrate of acts of power. Build-
ing on this unquestioned assumption, legal philosophers generally define legal power as 
the capacity to change a subject’s legal status through the ascription of rights and obli-
gations. To cite a perspicuous definition, 
[n]ormative power is the ability to take decisions that change what a person ought to do or 
ought not to do, or may or may not do, or what a person is able or unable to do, in the 
framework of some normative order, with or without the other person’s consent to this 
change.46 
Yet if a territory is the concrete unity of normative and physical dimensions, then the 
relation between territoriality and legal power is far more intimate than meets the eye 
in this definition. On the one hand, the definition overlooks the fact that legal power is 
essentially spatialising, or more properly, placialising: to ascribe rights and obligations 
is also always to assign a legal place to personsto emplace themand vice versa. 
Authorizations to third country nationals to enter the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, or the repatriation of illegal immigrants, are not the exceptional cases in which 
legal power emplaces; instead, these acts are particularly striking manifestations of 
what legal power always claims to do: to assign to each her/his own place. 
On the other hand, legal power can only emplace persons by claiming to be itself 
emplaced; to borrow a famous expression coined by H.L.A. Hart, a legal official adopts 
an “internal point of view”.47 This enigmatic formula has been the object of consider-
able controversy. It suffices to note, for the purpose of this paper, that the internal 
point of view consists, in the words of an able interpreter of Hart, in 
the committed point of view. It expresses the idea that sometimes a rule is action-guiding be-
cause it is viewed by those to whom it applies as reason-giving. Those who accept rules from 
an internal point of view see the rules as reason-giving in virtue of their being rules rather 
than in virtue of the sanction that might attend non-compliance with them.48 
Remarkably, however, neither Hart nor his commentators have considered the possibil-
ity that the idea of an “internal” point of view should be taken literally, such that not 
only is the internal point of view committed but also, and conversely, a committed 
point of view is necessarily internal, i.e. placially determined. For if, as argued hereto-
fore, a legal territory is the concrete unity of normative and physical dimensions, then a 
normative commitmentand this is ultimately a commitment to the common inter-
estis  eo ipse an internal commitmentthat is, a commitment to a common 
placeand vice versa. 
Yet if legal authorities emplace human behaviour by virtue of being themselves 
emplaced, to whom do they owe their own emplacement? How, in other words, does 
                                                   
46 Neil MacCormick, “Powers and Power-Conferring Norms”, in Stanley L. Paulson & Bonnie 
Litschewski Paulson (eds.) Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 495. 
47 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 89, 242. 
48 Jules Coleman, “Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis”, in 
Jules Coleman (ed.), Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p. 110. 
  22the internal perspective arise, without which legal authorities could not emplace free-
dom, security and justice? To pose this question is to return to the circularity hidden in 
Communication 459/98: exclusion from (and inclusion in) the Area is justified because 
this territory is the own place of European citizens, yet, to begin with, exclusion (and its 
attendant inclusion) gives rise to European citizens and their own place. Hence, the 
question about the reification of territorial unity is at bottom a question about the con-
ditions under which legal power can posit the boundaries of a territory. 
The upshot of the foregoing topogenetic inquiry is that while the Treaties neces-
sarily postulate Europe as the spatio-temporal origin of the European Union, the Union 
has no direct access to its origin. Europe can function as the origin of the European Un-
ion only if it is not in empirical space and time. More precisely, legal power has no di-
rect access to the aboriginal scission that gives rise to Europe, on the one hand, and the 
rest of the world, on the other. Instead, Europe only appears indirectly, by way of what 
legal power claims to be its representations: the internal market and the Area of Free-
dom, Security and Justice. So, paradoxically, everything begins with the representation; 
the original place of the European Union is necessarily a represented place, and its 
boundaries, represented boundaries. Consequently, Europe is, properly speaking, a 
utopia; it is nowhere and “nowhen”. The self-closure of the European Union comes 
about in the process by which legal power designates an empirically identifiable place 
and time by way of a detour through a first place and time that never could have 
beenand never can becomea “here” and a “now”. The act of self-closure by which 
the Union creates the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice takes on the paradoxical 
form of an irrevocable absence in presence. This paradox cannot simply be dismissed 
as a regrettable feature of the European Union, a blemish that marks its dubious de-
mocratic credentials; the reflexivity implied in self-legislation, self-determination and 
the like is necessarily mediate, representational. Any attempt to collapse the self-
reference of a community into pure presence, such that the presence to itself of a com-
munity in an absolute “here” and “now” would attest to and guarantee its self-
foundation, yields to the temptation of a metaphysics of presence.49 
The paradox of absence in presence also attaches to the European Union’s claim 
to an own place: it would not be possible for legal power to claim that the Area of Free-
dom, Security and Justice is the European Union’s own place unless this area is held to 
give legal expression to what is primordially the Union’s ownEurope, but what is 
primordially its own definitively eludes the European Union. Two implications flow 
from this insight. On the one hand, legal power is continuously called on to redefine the 
Union’s territorial unity precisely because it has no direct access to Europe as the origi-
nal place. In other words, legal power must unceasingly establish what defines the in-
ternal market and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice as a common place, i.e. as 
the European Union’s own place. This is tantamount to recognizing that the European 
                                                   
49 Although this issue falls beyond the scope of this paper, this is precisely the fundamental flaw of 
Hannah Arendt’s analysis of power. It has already been noted that she cannot account for the conditions by 
which a plurality of individuals identify themselves as a “we”. The reason for this becomes clear in her 
book, On Revolution, which is governed by the fundamental opposition between “representation versus 
action and participation”. Having set up this opposition, she then goes ahead to equate action and partici-
pation with self-government. She neither poses nor answers the question whether representation, in the 
sense discussed in the topogenesis of the European Union, is ingredient to action and participation. Ar-
endt’s description of her favoured models of self-governmentthe revolutionary councils and sovi-
etsconfirms, on closer scrutiny, the constitutive role of representation for self-government. See Hannah 
Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin, 1990 [1963]), p. 273. 
  23Union’s place in the legal place-world is not fixed. Obviously, this does not mean that 
the European Union “moves around” in the world, as human beings do. But the succes-
sive enlargements of this polity, as well as the sundry modifications of the conditions 
governing internal and external border crossings, would be unintelligible unless the 
European Union has to take up a relation to placeand to itself. On the other hand, the 
gap, both spatial and temporal, between Europe and the European Union is final, irre-
ducible. It explains why legal power can claim that by positing the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice it fulfils a European aspiration, yet also why the realization of the 
Area can be radically contested in the name of another Europe, of another emplace-
ment of freedom, security and justice that isliterallyelsewhere and “elsewhen”. The 
irreducible gap between Europe and the European Union ensures that Europe is never 
entirely the European Union’s own place; the Union’s territorial unity is a claimed 
unity, its identity a claimed identity. The paradoxical absence in presence that governs 
the exercise of legal power ensures that freedom, security and justice are in place and 
not in place in the European Union. 
 
 
V. European Public Order 
Yet to believe that these considerations exhaust the relation between legal power and 
territorial unity would be too pat, too reassuring, too comfortable. After all, as critics 
repeatedly point out, security, construed in a broad sense that includes combating in-
ternational organized crime and terrorism and dealing with illegal immigration, tends 
to eclipse freedom and justice. This diagnosis leads critics to focus their attention on 
the conditions, both normative and institutional, by means of which a “right balance” 
could be struck between these different values.50 Although this approach is certainly 
valid, it neglects what is, from the perspective of this paper, the fundamental issue at 
stake in the establishment and development of an Area of Freedom, Security and Jus-
tice: the territorial unity of the European Union. 
  Consider, from this perspective, the passage of Communication 459/98, in 
which the issue of security obtains its most pregnant formulation: 
It is in the framework of the consolidation of an area of freedom, security and justice that the 
concept of public order appears as the common denominator in a society based on democ-
racy and the rule of law. With the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, this concept 
which has hitherto been determined principally by each individual Member State will also 
have to be assessed in terms of the new European area. Independently of the responsibilities 
of Member States for maintaining public order, we will gradually have to shape a “European 
public order” based on an assessment of shared fundamental interests.51 
Not only does the Commission make clear that the notion of public order is the specific 
manner in which a legal order conceptualises the problem of security but it also indi-
cates that public order is intimately related to territorial unity. It is no coincidence that, 
as Article 64 (1) ECT puts it, 
This title shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon the Member 
States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal se-
curity (emphasis added). 
                                                   
50 See, for example, Malcom Anderson and Joanna Apap, Striking a Balance Between Freedom, 
Security and Justice (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2002). 
51 Comm. 459/98, supra note 24, at 156. 
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for Europe. Although transferring these responsibilities to legal officials who act on be-
half of the European Union would no doubt mark a decisive step in consolidating the 
autonomy of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice vis-à-vis the Member States, 
the core issue involved in shaping a European public order would remain unchanged: 
“the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security”. So, the 
question that arises with respect to Article 64(1) ECT is no less acute if these powers 
were transferred to European authorities: what sense can be made of the responsibility 
for maintaining law and order and the internal security of the European Union, given 
the strong form of an outside to which the Union is by no means immune? 
  The implications of this question become clearer if the Commission’s reference 
to European public order is contrasted with a remarkable chapter of Arendt’s book, The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, in which she describes the plight of statelessness, whether 
de jure or de facto. Paradoxically, she asserts, at the very moment “when we have really 
started to live in One World”, a new group of people emerges, the stateless, “who [have] 
to live outside the jurisdiction of [the laws of a nation-state] without being protected by 
any other”.52 This extraordinarily hazardous condition of homelessness to which the 
stateless find themselves exposed is the stark reality of “falling in between” (Zwischen-
Fall) the borders,53 not the place polygamy Beck attributes to his model transnational 
individuals. Arendt’s analysis reminds us that the real alternative to belonging some-
where is not to be at home in several places, as Beck would have us believe, for this is 
still to be in place, but to belong nowhere, to be neither here nor there. 
The crucial point, as she sees it, is that the condition of statelessness under-
mines the legal order itself: 
Much worse than what statelessness did to the time-honored and necessary distinctions be-
tween nationals and foreigners, and to the sovereign right of states in matters of nationality 
and expulsion, was the damage suffered by the very structure of national legal institutions 
when a growing number of residents had to live outside the jurisdiction of these laws and 
without being protected by any other. The stateless person, without right to residence and 
without the right to work, had of course constantly to transgress the law. He was liable to jail 
sentences without ever having committing a crime. More than that, the entire hierarchy of 
values which pertain in civilized countries was reversed in his case. Since he was an anomaly 
for whom the general law did not provide, it was better for him to become an anomaly for 
which it did provide, that of the criminal.54  
These premonitory words, although they refer to the period between the two World 
Wars of the XXth century, have lost none of their relevance in the light of the current 
paradox confronting the fledgling European public order. As has been forcefully ar-
gued, the detention of illegal immigrants by the authorities of the Union’s Member 
States undermines general principles of criminal law, including adequate legal assis-
tance, full judicial control and proportionality of the sanction with respect to the of-
fence.55 From the point of view of such principles, the claim that detention centres are 
the illegal immigrants’ own place within the Union, until such time as they can be repa-
                                                   
52 Arendt, Totalitarianism, supra note 39, at 297, 286. 
53 Beck, Globalization, supra note 3, at 51. 
54 Arendt, Totalitarianism, supra note 39, at 286. 
55 See Anton van Kalmthout, “Eine noch unbekannte Kategorie im Freiheitsentzug: Die illegalen 
Immigranten”, in Andrea Baechtold & Ariane Senn (eds.), Brennpunkt Strafvollzug (Bern: Stämpfli Ver-
lag, 2002), p. 239. 
  25triated, becomes questionable on the basis of the founding principles of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice. This example is symptomatic of a more general phe-
nomenon: increasingly, the distinction between political asylum seekers and economic 
migrants at the heart of Member States’ immigration policy can only be enforced by 
compromising the very rule of law on which the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
is held to be grounded. Increasingly, the mandate contained in Article 64(1) can only be 
achieved at the cost of breaching values held to be common to the European Union. By 
breaching these values, the acts exercised pursuant to Article 64(1) also breach the 
powers it confers on legal authorities to maintain law and order. In the process of en-
forcing the European Union’s claim to an own place, the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice becomes unrecognisable as the Union’s own place. Another Europe and another 
legal place-world leave their traces indirectly in the Union, by way of a territorial unity 
compromised from within: the breach of the rule of law required to maintain law and 
order and enforce internal security discloses the Union ex negativo as an area of servi-
tude, of insecurity, of injustice. 
This paradox acquires its most acute manifestation when the avowed aim of 
maintaining public order leads legal authorities to suspend law and order, such that, 
divested of its normative dimension, a territory ceases to be such. This, precisely, is 
what Carl Schmitt calls the “state of exception”. I submit that achieving a “right bal-
ance” between freedom, security and justice is indeed a constitutional question, as Neil 
Walker argues, but first and foremost because what is at stake is holding in abeyance 
the paradox Schmitt was keenly aware of, namely that, during the state of exception, 
the constitution is suspended in order to preserve it. Independently of the features that 
might define the European Union as a post-national polity, the paradox accompanying 
the state of exception lurks as much in post-national constitutionalism as it does in na-
tional constitutionalism.56 Linking the state of exception to territoriality, the latent 
paradox in the notion of European public order reaches a critical point when, to enforce 
the claim to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice as the European Union’s own 
place, legal officials dis-own it, as attested to by the airport waiting zones in which for-
eigners are detained, pending the processing of their request for refugee status by a 
Member State.57 These waiting zones do not merely reveal the Union as an area of servi-
tude, insecurity and injustice; more radically, even the possibility of this ex negativo 
characterization disappears because the legal norms by reference to which such a quali-
fication could be uttered have been suspended with respect to the foreigners who popu-
late these “absolute non-places”.58 By undoing the concrete unity of territoriality, such 
that what remains is its purely physical substrate, a parallel detachment takes place 
with respect to the foreigner, who, divested of her/his status as a legal subject, becomes 
a human being who can lay claim to nothing more than “the abstract nakedness of be-
                                                   
56 Abstracting from all differences related to functional matters, the essential criterion with which 
to establish whether post-national constitutionalism takes a decisive step beyond the constitutional prac-
tices of the nation-state may well be its capacity to devise institutional venues that allow it to deal with this 
paradox in a new way. 
57 “[A]n apparently innocuous space (for example, the Hôtel Arcades in Roissy) actually delimits a 
space in which the normal order is de facto suspended and in which whether or not atrocities are commit-
ted depends not on law but on the civility and ethical sense of the police who temporarily act as sovereign 
(for example, in the four days during which foreigners can be held in the zone d’attente before the inter-
vention of the judicial authority)”. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. 
Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 174. 
58 Giorgio Agamben, État d’exception (Paris: Seuil, 2003), p. 87. 
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ing human”.59 What had been legal power now comes to stand, as naked power, over 
and against this abstract nakedness. Accordingly, in the same move by which a legal 
community dis-owns part of its territory, the community’s legal officials cease to be 
such in their treatment of foreigners: to dis-own a place is to disavow the acts that oc-
cur therein as acts of legal officials, bringing to a halt the self-reference of a legal com-
munity, hence democratic self-government. Giving the Commission’s words a twist it 
would certainly want to conceal, public order ultimately “appears as the common de-
nominator in a society based on democracy and the rule of law” by virtue of suspending 
democracy and the rule of law. 
It may well be the case that, whatever its concrete manifestations, this paradox 
is ultimatelythat is to say, in the extreme situationconstitutive for the territorial 
unity of every order of positive law. In any event, dealing with this unbearable paradox 
now suggests the need for extreme measures by legal officials, measures, as the word’s 
etymology indicates, that are on the outside. On this reading of the current situation, 
taking on responsibility for maintaining law and order and safeguarding internal secu-
rity calls on legal authorities to transgress the territorial unity of the European Union, 
positing its boundaries anew from a place inside and outside the Area of Freedom, Se-
curity and Justice. 
 
59 Arendt, Totalitarianism, supra note 39, at 297. 